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Abstract
This article reveals the interplay between assessment policies in Uruguay
and the nature of State-societal relations. The central State has been
historically a staunch defender of public education and has championed
the cause of equalizing opportunities for the most disadvantaged sectors
of society. The national evaluation system of student performance has
been constructed as an expression of this tradition. The Uruguayan
government sought to build a wide level of consensus with respect to the
assessment instruments by encouraging educators to participate and buy
into the assessment initiative. Moreover, the national government shifted
the focus of the national evaluation from measuring schooling outcomes
to addressing the social wants that condition student learning. Hence, the
national evaluation has come to symbolize an agreed-upon mechanism of
social accountability by which the central government upholds its
responsibility for educational provision as it intervenes on behalf of
impoverished communities. (Note 1)
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        This study reveals the interplay between assessment policies in Uruguay and the
nature of State-societal relations. The central State has been historically a staunch
defender of public education and has championed the cause of equalizing opportunities
for the most disadvantaged sectors of society. The national evaluation system of student
performance has been constructed as an expression of this tradition. 
        The first section describes the educational system as a highly centralized
organizational structure. Then, it provides a brief overview of the education reform
initiative launched in 1995 by the National Administration of Public Education to
promote and consolidate social equity. 
        The second section portrays the Unidad de Medición de Resultados Educativos (the 
evaluation agency of primary education) as a temporary unit created in 1996 within the
framework of a project financed by the World Bank. In spite of its short history, the
assessment system has garnered substantial popular support and spurred a curricular and
pedagogical renovation among teachers, principals and supervisors. 
        The third section explores the reasons behind the public embrace of the national
assessment system. This has been no slight accomplishment in light of the fact that the
evaluation of student performance may potentially exert a destabilizing role by
highlighting deficiencies in educational service provision. First, the central State
circumscribed teacher liability over poor performance, largely assuming itself the
responsibility for the character of schooling. Second, the national government built a
wide level of consensus with respect to the assessment instruments by encouraging
educators to participate and buy into the assessment initiative. Third, the national
government shifted the focus of the national evaluation from measuring schooling
outcomes to addressing the social wants that condition student learning. Hence, the
national evaluation has come to symbolize an agreed-upon mechanism of social
accountability by which the central government upholds its responsibility for educational
provision as it intervenes on behalf of impoverished communities. 
        Assessment may in fact reify centralized control by imposing standards that must
be uniformly enforced throughout the country. Paradoxically, in Uruguay's highly
concentrated model of governance, the national evaluation proves that centralization
need not be incompatible with democratic participation.
The process of education reform in Uruguay
The Uruguayan educational system 
        The educational system of the Republic of Uruguay is organized in three levels.
(Note 2) Initial education caters to children between 3 and 5 years of age. Preschool
instruction is not compulsory presently, but the government plans to make it obligatory
for 4 and 5 year-old children in the proximate future. Primary education consists of six
grades and services 6 to 11 year-old children. Secondary education consists of two
sub-cycles. The Ciclo Básico Único (Unique Basic Cycle) is a three-year course
common to all students between 12 and 14 years of age. Students may then opt to
proceed for baccalaureate or technical-professional instruction to round off their
secondary education. Training at this level may last between 2 and 7 years depending on
the course. Primary schooling and the Unique Basic Cycle constitute the national
compulsory educational requirements (Uruguay—Ministerio de Educación y Cultura,
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1996).
        The administration of the education sector is highly centralized, but falls under the
jurisdiction of several independent de-concentrated councils. The Ministry of Education
and Culture is responsible for devising broad national educational policies. Despite its
overarching mandate, this Ministry has a subsidiary role in the operations of the
education sector. The Administración Nacional de Educación Pública (ANEP), the 
National Administration of Public Education, is the agency responsible for the
management of the public educational system. The ANEP is fully autonomous from the
Ministry of Education and Culture and it is configured by several bodies: (a) the Central
Board Council (CODICEN), (b) the Council of Primary Education (CEP), (c) the
Council of Secondary Education (CES), and (d) the Council of Technical-Professional
Education. The Central Board Council is the highest administrative authority in the
education sector. It is comprised of 5 members elected by the President and approved by
the Senate. The other three councils are subordinate to the CODICEN, but they function
largely autonomously. They are responsible for imparting, administering and supervising
educational services. The directors of these councils are appointed by the CODICEN
(see Figure 1).
        Educational policy is also shaped by several independent official advisory bodies to
the ANEP. The Coordinating Commission of Education consists of the Minister of
Education and Culture, the highest authorities of the autonomous councils as well as by
representatives of universities and post-graduate institutions. It propounds guidelines
and draft agreements for the coordination of the education sector. The Asambleas
Técnico-Docentes (Technical-Pedagogical Assemblies or ATDs) are national and
regional deliberative bodies comprised of teachers elected through secret compulsory
voting. ATDs pronounce opinions regarding the conditions of education and may initiate
educational policy directives (González Rissotto, 1997). 
        Basic education has reached universal proportions in Uruguay. In 1995, net
enrollment rates at the primary school level encompassed 95% of the 6 to 11 year-old
cohort. At the Unique Basic Cycle level, matriculation rates averaged 67% for the
4 of 40
relevant school-aged population in Montevideo and 57% for all other urban areas in the
rest of the country. Participation rates drop sharply in the second cycle of high-school
instruction. Net enrollments at this level were below 30%. Total expenditures in
education amounted to US$ 578 million in 1995, which represents 3.4% of the gross
national product. The private sector caters to 13% of primary school students and 14%
of secondary school enrollments (Uruguay—Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, 1997).
        Uruguay has a shortage of teachers. The imbalance between teacher supply and
demand has prompted governmental authorities to allow instructors to work double
shifts. Teachers' real income has deteriorated steadily, even declining during periods of
private real income recovery. Between 1960 and 1989, real salaries for teachers declined
by 46.6%. Monthly wages in 1996 ranged between US$ 270 and US$ 407
(Uruguay—Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, 1996). Low salaries have forced teachers
to search for alternative sources of income.
The Uruguayan education reform 
        A concern for the inequities in the Uruguayan educational system has prompted the
government to embark on an ambitious reform initiative. Net enrollment rates for the
population in chronic poverty reach 27% for preschoolers and 34% for high school
students. The dropout rates for the poorest children in the first cycle of obligatory
secondary education surpass 37%. There is also growing weariness about the
deterioration of the quality of education. The national assessment of student
achievement revealed that 6th graders in extreme poverty responded correctly to 37%
and 17% of a language and mathematics test on average. The national means are nearly
20 percentage points above these levels. Primary school repetition rates have remained
stable at around 10% during the past fifteen years. The repetition rate in the first grade,
however, has reached 22%. In Montevideo, 63 out of 257 schools have a repetition rate
in the first grade above 30%, and another 67 establishments between 20% and 29%
(Rama, 1998). 
        The current administration of the ANEP has adopted four guiding principles to
transform the educational system (Rama, 1998; Uruguay—Ministerio de Educación y
Cultura, 1996):
The consolidation of social equity,1.
The appreciation of teacher professionalism and training,2.
The improvement of educational quality, and3.
The strengthening of institutional management4.
        The consolidation of social equity effort directs services and compensatory actions
to underprivileged children. The ANEP seeks to extend public preschool services to
95% of the 5 year-old population and conduct an outreach program to incorporate 85%
of 12 to 14 year-olds to the first cycle of secondary schooling. The poorest students
receive more hours of instruction, including “full-time” schooling. They also have
access to a comprehensive school meal program. 
        The appreciation of teacher professionalism effort strives to double the graduation
rates of primary school teachers and triple that of secondary school instructors by the end
of 1999. Approximately 90% of the elementary school teacher corps and 4,300
non-certified high school instructors will receive in-service professional development
training. Teacher salaries were planned to undergo an increase of 13% in 1996, 10% in
1997, 15% in 1998 and 18% in 1999. In actuality, teacher salaries did rise over the
yearly inflation rates, but did not reach the goals originally contemplated. Nonetheless,
education was the only social sector that received an appropriation to increase salaries
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and its general operating budget in August 1998.
        The educational quality enhancement effort focused around the widespread
distribution of textbooks, instructional materials and pedagogical resources to public
establishments. Curricular programs at the secondary level are also undergoing an
in-depth review and renovation. In addition, the ANEP finances school-based projects to
address specific needs within educational communities. Finally, the government has
launched a program, “All Children Can Learn,” to reduce primary school repetition
rates. This program consists of a series of integrated social activities that endeavor to
facilitate the access and permanence of children in schools, to strengthen the
coordination between preschool and primary education, to enhance teacher training and
to use textbooks as “an instrument for open learning” (Rama, 1998). 
        The strengthening of institutional management effort encompasses specialized
training for school principals as well as the creation of computerized systems to assist
administrators in their functions. Rural schools with less than ten students are being
consolidated in order to reduce wastage and promote a more efficient use of resources. 
        These four initiatives are funded by a 22% increase in the education sector
appropriation. The 1996-2000 budget has grown by US$ 75 million from the 1991-1995
budget, to US$ 430 million. The government of Uruguay also receives substantial aid
from the international donor community to implement these reforms. The Inter
American Development Bank and the World Bank have lent $140 million dollars to the
modernization of the educational system. The Project for the Improvement of the Quality
of Primary Education (MECAEP), (Note 3) funded by the World Bank, has contributed
to the construction of preschools, the in-service training of elementary school teachers,
and the provision of textbooks and pedagogical resources. It also supports the Unidad de 
Medición de Resultados Educativos (UMRE), the agency responsible for assessing
educational quality at the primary level. The Project for the Improvement of the Quality
of Basic Education and the Instruction and Training of Teachers (MESyFOD), funded by
the Inter American Development Bank, has supported the creation of five regional
teacher training centers, the in- service development of high school instructors, and the
maintenance of secondary school infrastructure. In addition, MESyFOD has conducted
the national assessment of student achievement at the secondary level in 1999.
2. Student assessment practices in Uruguay (Note 4)
 A. The measurement of student achievement
  Initial experiences with student assessment 
        Between 1990 and 1994, the United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) conducted a series of studies requisitioned by the
National Administration of Public Education. These studies were based on two
examinations administered in 1990 to a small sample of 4th and 9th grade students in
language and mathematics. CEPAL also collected socioeconomic and background
information from parents, teachers and principals. The purpose of these tests was to
explore the conditions of basic and secondary education in Uruguay (Comisión
Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, 1994; 1993; 1992; 1991; 1990). 
        The primary school evaluation revealed that on average students could respond
correctly to 58% of the questions (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el
Caribe, 1991). The results from the secondary school evaluation were significantly
inferior. Less than 22% of public school students reached an adequate level of
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proficiency in mathematics or language, as opposed to over 50% in the private sector.
The mathematics test showed that “students learn very little in the courses of the Unique
Basic Cycle.” The language scores exposed that “the probability of success of the great
majority of public establishments is so low that failure is almost certain” (Comisión
Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, 1992: 90, 122). 
        The reports produced by CEPAL, however, abstained from making curt accounts or
generic descriptions of student outcomes. Rather, test scores were the starting point for
in-depth analyses of the impact of socioeconomic variables on student learning.
Predictably, CEPAL found that low- income children tend to have lower levels of
academic attainment. After an exhaustive review of the effect of various sociocultural
indicators on school performance, the CEPAL underscored that maternal educational
level is the best predictor of student achievement (Ravela, 1997b). 
        The research agenda of this study also included the identification of schools that,
despite serving disadvantaged populations, have attained high levels of academic
performance. These educational establishments were denominated “exemplary schools.”
The CEPAL carried out a qualitative investigation of these schools and posited that there
were four factors that explain scholastic excellence in underprivileged environments:
the ability of the principal to assume a leadership role in the school as well as in
its community,
1.
the knowledge and experience of the classroom teacher combined with the
satisfaction and commitment to his/her work,
2.
a dynamic pedagogical culture within the teacher cadre, and3.
the existence of significant bonds between the educational establishment and
parents (Ravela, 1997a).
4.
Finally, the CEPAL emphasized that low test scores were symptomatic of a systemic
crisis in the education sector.
The reason for the results is not the fault of educational establishments or
their authorities.... They are the outcome of a prolonged social process,
during a prolonged historical period, during which the quality of education
ceased to be a priority as an objective of State action (Comisión Económica
para América Latina y el Caribe, 1992: 123).
        In other words, the deterioration of educational quality was ascribed to a lack of
commitment from the central State to make adequate investments in schooling services.
According to this report, the reversal of this situation would follow from the initiative of
the national government towards promoting policies and programs that support the labor
of teachers and principals.
  The construction of a national assessment system 
        It could be said that Uruguay does not have an institutionalized national assessment
system. UMRE, the unit responsible for the measurement of academic achievement at
the primary education level, is not a formal “line- agency” of the National
Administration of Public Education. It is an ad hoc unit initially constituted to
implement the evaluation sub-component of the MECAEP Project financed by the
World Bank. UMRE must abide by the directives of the Central Board Council, but it is
exonerated from following certain civil service regulations. Similarly, the secondary
education evaluation was developed autonomously within the framework of the
MESyFOD Project, funded by the Inter American Development Bank. Although there
are plans to make student assessment a permanent entity within the governmental
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organizational structure, the appraisal of academic performance currently operates from
quasi-independent transitory agencies. This situation has provided to the evaluation of
student achievement certain degree of independence and freedom—in relation to its
organization, operation and personnel selection—by means of its ability to proceed
outside the strict channels that regulate public offices. On the other hand, and as it will
be described in a later section, this “extra-official” character has generated concern
among certain sectors of the educational community, and particularly among the school
inspectorate, who perceive UMRE as a parallel entity, alien to them. 
        The systematic and periodic measurement of schooling outcomes was not an
initiative of the Uruguayan government. It was a conditional clause for the appropriation
of the MECAEP World Bank loan (Interview UGN1). Although initially greeted with
some resistance, the Uruguayan government eventually welcomed the creation of an
evaluation unit (Interview UGN34). Germán Rama, who became Director of the ANEP
in 1995, had been responsible for the design and implementation of the CEPAL study on
student achievement aforementioned. Under his leadership, the Central Board Council
decreed a resolution in March 1996 stipulating that “one of the prioritized lines of action
of this Council is the implementation of assessment systems of [student] learning …
with the objective to appraise the performance of this Organism and the quality of
service it provides to the population” (Uruguay—Administración Nacional de Educación
Pública, 1996b). 
        UMRE has been in operation since 1994. Pilot tests for a 3rd and 6th grade
evaluation were conducted late that year, with the intention to launch the first national
assessment in 1995. When Dr. Rama assumed control of the ANEP in mid 1995,
however, he replaced the technical leadership of UMRE and resolved to postpone the
exam for one year. The national assessment underwent an important reformation. First,
the ANEP would evaluate all public and private school students in 6th and 9th grades,
the terminal years of the primary and secondary educational levels, every three years.
Second, the test would veer from appraising curricular contents to measuring skills and
competencies (such as reading comprehension or problem resolution). Third, the
evaluation would incorporate a detailed sociocultural survey to be completed by parents,
teachers and principals. Fourth, UMRE would seek feedback about its mission and
operations from the various stakeholders involved in the provision of schooling services.
Fifth, governmental authorities committed to maintaining secrecy about individual
school test results. The ANEP guaranteed that only aggregate data would be made public
(UMRE, 1996e). 
        UMRE is constituted by 3 full-time and 5 part-time professionals. It is responsible
for the design, implementation, analysis, and devolution of results of the primary
education assessment. From practically its inception, public and private school
authorities as well as policy makers, supervisors and teachers were consulted about the
development of instruments, test administration practices, and the uses of assessment
results. The government also held regular informative workshops and produced several
publications to raise awareness about the objectives of collecting student data (UMRE,
1996e). UMRE devoted significant effort to securing support and building consensus for
the national assessment across the gamut of educational actors. In 1996, an “Advisory
Group” was consolidated to review the work of UMRE and promote cooperative
participation. This committee is conformed by national and regional representatives
from the Council of Primary Education, the supervisory cadre, teacher training
institutions, the Technical-Pedagogical Assembly, the Association of Private Education
Establishments, the Uruguayan Association of Catholic Education, and the Uruguayan
Federation of Teachers (the national teachers' union). 
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        UMRE administered the first standardized evaluation in mathematics and language
to all 6th grade students in 1996. Rural schools with less than six pupils in the sixth
grade classroom were exempted from participation. Absenteeism rates were below 3.5%
of the total enrollment in the mathematics test and 6.2% in the language test. In addition,
educators and parents were required to complete socioeconomic background surveys.
The rate of parental response to this survey was 98.5% (UMRE, 1998c). 
        The exams consisted of multiple choice items and open-ended questions. Teachers
and supervisors participated in the formulation of test items, but technical staff from
UMRE ultimately devised the exam. (Note 5) Independent proctors monitored the
administration of the assessment. Students were allotted one hour and thirty minutes to
complete the test, but those who required additional time to finish were allowed to do so
(UMRE, 1996f). UMRE was responsible for correcting the exams and analyzing the
results. 
        Forty days after the application of the test and prior to the culmination of the
academic year, schools received an individualized confidential report with aggregate
school results item by item. The socioeconomic background surveys served as a basis to
categorize schools into five categories, from very unfavorable to very favorable contexts.
Student outcomes were compared to the national average, the departmental/regional
average and that of schools that service students from similar socioeconomic conditions.
Educational establishments also obtained two technical manuals to interpret results. In
the following academic year, educators received a second confidential report with a
sociocultural profile of their school, based on background questionnaire data. UMRE
also produced methodological guides with pedagogical suggestions and
recommendations to redress weaknesses identified in mathematics and language
(UMRE, 1997b; 1997c; 1997d; 1997f; 1997g; 1996c; 1996d; 1996g). 
        UMRE tailored several reports for the supervisory cadre. School inspectors
participated in workshops where they received a regional profile of local schools and a
“socioacademic map” that classified educational establishments under their oversight in
terms of achievement levels and socioeconomic context. These instruments would allow
supervisors to identify exemplary schools that exhibited high test scores in spite of being
resource poor. They were also meant for targeting compensatory interventions to low
performing educational establishments.
  UMRE results 
        The national assessment of 6th grade students showed that 57.1% of students were
able to respond to more than 60% of the language test correctly. The success rate in
mathematics was considerably lower. Only 34.6% of students were able to answer over
60% of the questions satisfactorily. The percentage of students that did not reach the
60% “adequacy level” in both tests was 37.9%. 
        The first official report of results for public dissemination highlighted the role of
contextual variables in the acquisition of knowledge. Students were classified into four
categories according to their sociocultural context. Sociocultural context was defined in
terms of maternal educational level. Schools from “very favorable” contexts were
characterized as those with over 50% of students whose mothers completed at least
secondary education. Schools from “very unfavorable” contexts were characterized as
those where less than one out of two mothers had received only a primary education, and
at most one out of ten mothers had received a secondary education. 
        As the CEPAL studies had demonstrated earlier, students from underprivileged
backgrounds scored significantly below students from more affluent families (see Tables
1 and 2). While over 85% of children from “very favorable” contexts answered correctly
9 of 40
to at least 60% of the language test correctly, less than 40% of students from “very
unfavorable” contexts attained the same level of achievement. In mathematics, the gap
between high- and low-income children widened.
Table 1
Percentage of Students by Performance Level in 
Mathematics and School Sociocultural Context
 
Very 
Favorable
Medium 
High
Medium 
Low
Very 
Unfavorable Total
Highly Satisfactory 
(scores above 80%) 21.0% 8.4% 3.4% 2.0% 6.8%
Satisfactory
(scores 60% to 
80%)
45.6% 35.3% 23.2% 15.7% 27.8%
Unsatisfactory
(scores 30% to 
60%)
30.6% 49.7% 60.7% 64.4% 54.5%
Very unsatisfactory
(scores below 30%) 2.8% 6.7% 12.7% 17.9% 10.9%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: UMRE (1996g), p. 10.
 
Table 2
Percentage of Students by Performance Level in 
Language and School Sociocultural Context
 
Very 
Favorable
Medium 
High
Medium 
Low
Very 
Unfavorable Total
Highly 
Satisfactory
(scores above 
80%)
41.9% 19.5% 9.8% 5.0% 15.8%
Satisfactory
(scores 60% to 
80%)
43.3% 48.1% 40.9% 32.8% 41.3%
Unsatisfactory
(scores 30% to 
60%)
14.0% 29.7% 43.2% 52.7% 37.7%
Very 
unsatisfactory
(scores below 
30%)
0.8% 2.8% 6.1% 9.5% 5.2%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Source: UMRE (1996g), p. 10.
        UMRE produced a second report exploring the relationship between sociocultural
factors and student achievement. This study categorized the Uruguayan educational
system into five subsystems according to geographical and sociocultural variables. This
study revealed that private schools in Montevideo generally attracted students with the
highest maternal educational levels, followed by, in decreasing order of maternal
educational level, private schools in the interior, public schools in Montevideo, public
schools in the interior, and rural schools. School performance in these subsystems was
closely correlated to sociocultural context, with the exception of rural schools that
evinced academic achievement levels slightly greater than expected for their low
sociocultural context (UMRE, 1997f). More importantly, this report provided proof that
academic achievement levels were not directly tied to the public or private nature of
schooling, but rather to the sociocultural composition of the student body. In other
words, the average scores of public schools from very favorable contexts were similar
to those of their private counterparts within this context. The outcomes of private
schools that served underprivileged populations were also analogous to those of public
schools that assisted students from very unfavorable contexts. (Note 6)
        A third national report was released late in 1997 providing a meticulous
institutional profile of educational establishments. This document was based on the
background surveys provided by principals, teachers and parents. It depicted the
attributes of building facilities, school materials, class size, years of experience of
principals, teacher training, pedagogical approaches favored, staff turnover, parental
involvement, and student self-esteem (UMRE, 1997g). As in previous inquiries, the
analysis gravitated around the relationship between sociocultural context and schooling
conditions.
        Overall, the Uruguay government emphasized consistently throughout its public
reports the role played by contextual factors in student learning. Average student scores,
as all comparisons between geographic regions or between the public and the private
sectors, were presented in direct relation to the sociocultural level in which learning took
place. School-level data was kept rigorously confidential.
  Other assessment activities 
        In addition to the sixth grade assessment, the Uruguayan government has
undertaken two other evaluation exercises. Firstly, the government conducted an
experimental assessment to a stratified sample of 3rd grade classrooms late in 1998. This
test was available to other educational establishments outside the controlled sample for
self- administration on a voluntary basis. The Central Board Council, however, exhorted
all educational establishments to take part of this initiative (UMRE, 1998a). The purpose
of this evaluation was to appraise student competencies at mid- point of their primary
schooling. It also pursued to signal teachers about the expected competencies pupils
ought to master by the third grade and provide them with an early- warning system to
reformulate programmatic contents and pedagogical strategies (UMRE, 1997a). 
        The exam consisted of open-ended questions that integrated concepts from a variety
of disciplines (mathematics, language, social studies, natural sciences, moral education,
art) without compartmentalizing them into different spheres of knowledge. In response
to teachers' demands for greater participation in the formulation of the test, UMRE
established working groups with educators selected by the supervisory cadre, the
regional Technical-Pedagogical Assemblies, and the associations of private independent
and private Catholic schools. These working groups identified curricular areas to be
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evaluated and collaborated in the development of test items. 
        An informational document providing detailed information about the proposed
testing scheme and objectives was drafted and distributed to all teachers and school
inspectors. UMRE later requested teachers to respond to an opinion survey regarding the
assessment instrument and competencies to be evaluated. Ninety two percent of
respondents declared that the test was “adequate” and there was complete agreement
about the competencies selected (UMRE, 1998b). As in the 6th grade assessment, the 
measurement instrument included background surveys for parents, teachers and
principals in order to obtain data regarding the conditions in which student learning took
place. 
        Every educational establishment received a report with national aggregate averages
by competencies (reading comprehension, resolution of problems, processing
information). Test scores were also broken down by socioeconomic context (rural, very
favorable, favorable, medium, unfavorable and very unfavorable). A supplementary
report detailed average background information (maternal educational level, home
overcrowding, books in the house, preschool training) tabulated by sociocultural context.
Schools that did not participate in the controlled sample received as well a standardized
correction manual so that they could tally their own in-house results and compare them
to the official national average scores. 
        Secondly, the 6th grade cohort evaluated in 1996 was re-tested in 1999 as students
completed their 9th grade. MESyFOD, the project responsible for the administration of
the test, espoused a methodology similar to that implemented by UMRE. The evaluation
team sought to conduct informational sessions with supervisors, private and public
school instructors, the Technical-Pedagogical Assemblies (ATD) and the teachers' union
to gain their support. MESyFOD also intended to establish an advisory group conformed
by representatives from every sector of the educational system that would review its
operations. At the time the data collection for this study was conducted, it was unclear
whether MESyFOD would be able to build consensus for the evaluation, especially from
the ATDs and the Federación Nacional de Profesores de Enseñanza Secundaria, the
national secondary school teachers' union. Secondary school teachers had adopted a
more contentious stance towards the central government's reform initiatives than primary
school educators. ATD representatives had refused in the past to collaborate in projects
spearheaded by MESyFOD (Interviews UGN3, UGN3b). (Note 7) 
        The MESyFOD team, however, concedes that the national experience with UMRE
had greatly eased their work nonetheless. In most instances, educational establishments
offered little resistance. They had not questioned the government's rationale for
conducting this initiative nor were they concerned about being penalized for poor
performance.
Our undertaking has been facilitated due to the fact that MECAEP has been
very careful about the confidentiality of test results, about the prompt
devolution of scores, about the provision of individualized reports to each
educational center. They took a series of precautions that, for instance, have
encouraged private schools to open their doors. … The realities of
secondary education are not the same as those of the primary level, and
there's still all the prejudices about standardized evaluations, but we're
going along (Interview UGN3).
The assessment involved approximately 40,000 students. It appraised achievement in
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language, mathematics, social studies and natural sciences. Tests were administered by
independent proctors and corrected centrally by MESyFOD.
B. The uses of assessment data
        The findings uncovered by the first national measurement of student achievement
are aimed at three distinct audiences: (a) the central government, (b) the school
inspectorate, and (c) teachers and principals. Parents are informed indirectly about the
general conditions of schooling through the press. A few schools, mostly in the private
sector, have taken the initiative to publicize their scores to the families they serve.
The central government
The national evaluation of student learning has as its official mandate:
        to produce information about the extent to which primary school
graduates have been able to develop the skills and fundamental
understandings in Language and Mathematics that every Uruguayan child
ought to have incorporated regardless of his social origin, economic
condition, or local context (UMRE, 1996b: 1).
        This mission statement underscores the diagnostic objectives of assessment. “To
have this information available,” claims the ANEP, “is crucial to recuperate the
democratizing role of the national educational system.” Equity considerations lie at the
heart of the central government's involvement in the measurement of academic
outcomes. 
        The ANEP has relied on data gathered by UMRE primarily to guide and inform
compensatory policies. There are three autonomous agencies within the national
government that are consumers of information generated by UMRE: (a) the Council of
Primary Education (CEP), (b) the MECAEP project (which is administered
independently from the CEP), and (c) the Planning Area of the ANEP, a unit that
depends directly from the Central Board Council.
        The MECAEP project has been the most active patron of assessment data. On one
hand, MECAEP has played a key role in promoting reflection among educators
regarding the results of the first national evaluation. Technical discussions about the
meanings of UMRE's findings have become a standard feature of institutional planning
or professional development workshops organized for school inspectors and principals
(Uruguay—ANEP-MECAEP, 1997). On the other hand, test scores and UMRE's
classification of schools according to sociocultural context guide many of the initiatives
undertaken by MECAEP. For instance, MECAEP disburses US$ 3,000 government
grants for school-based projects. The selection process takes into account how these
projects may address shortcomings identified by the UMRE evaluation. Moreover,
priority is awarded to schools from “unfavorable” sociocultural environments
(Uruguay—ANEP-CODICEN, 1998). Sociocultural context, as defined by UMRE, has
also become a salient criterion for the allocation of resources. The official press release
detailing the outcomes of the first evaluation to the general public, for example,
announced that MECAEP earmarked US$ 1 million to the purchase of pedagogical
materials, targeting specifically 400 schools from unfavorable contexts
(Uruguay—Administración Nacional de Educación Pública, 1996a). 
        "The Council [of Primary Education] permanently solicits information from
UMRE," states a senior government official. “We are interested in learning about the
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strengths and weaknesses in language and math achievement, as well as about the
relationship between school and family variables” (Interview UGN6). In practice,
although the CEP's school inspectorate has been an important end user of test data, the
central CEP office has given at best limited application to the UMRE results. School test
scores have been used as educational quality indicators for the program “All Children
Can Learn.” This initiative strives to reduce repetition rates below the 20% mark in 160
schools through a comprehensive set of activities that include teacher training, providing
health care services, reaching out to parents, and supplying textbooks
(Uruguay—ANEP-CODICEN, 1998). Achievement levels have not been a parameter for
bringing schools into the program, but test outcomes are occasionally used to tailor
specific remedial actions in some establishments. Outside this initiative, the Council of
Primary Education does not rely on UMRE data for other purposes. This has been a
source of disappointment for some UMRE officials (Interviews UGN1, UGN2). 
        Finally, the Planning Area of the ANEP has depended on UMRE's school
socioeconomic data for several of its own activities as well. In 1998, it conducted a
research project on variables associated with primary education repetition rates (Área de
Planeamiento de ANEP, 1998). This study demonstrated a close relationship between
sociocultural context and the likelihood that students will be held back in the first and
second grades. In addition, school background information has been “a fundamental
referent” in the identification of establishments that could benefit from recent
government initiatives, such as in-school meals, school infrastructure maintenance, or
classroom construction (Interview UGN7). It is expected that once the MECAEP project
comes to its conclusion, UMRE will become part of the Planning Area of the ANEP.
(Note 8)
UMRE's own policy initiatives 
        The Council of Primary Education maintains that UMRE's role “is bounded to
describing what happens” and “providing statistical data,” so that, in turn, this
knowledge can serve “the relevant organisms to make pertinent decisions” (Interview
UGN6). In practice, UMRE has been more than just an information- gathering agency. It
has been intimately involved in the design and promotion of educational policies for
schools from “very unfavorable” contexts. 
        UMRE, with support from regional Institutes for Teacher Training, developed a
Saturday workshop series for 541 urban primary schools serving underprivileged
communities (approximately 40% of all public establishments). Participation in this
four-month seminar was voluntary, but in order to qualify, at least half of a school's
professional staff must have agreed to participate. Teachers were remunerated for the
time they dedicated to this venture with a monthly monetary bonus equivalent to 30% of
the average teacher salary. 
        Furthermore, UMRE established a fund to finance propositions that could enhance
educational quality. Teacher training institutes received $1,000 awards to foster “the
accumulation of knowledge about [student] learning in unfavorable environments and
the implementation of professional development activities in teacher training institutions
around these themes” (UMRE, 1997e: 1). Low-income schools could solicit $1,000
grants for the implementation of intervention projects destined to improve achievement
levels in that educational community. The resources made available, however, would
only allow for 50 school awards altogether. 
        Lastly, UMRE, in collaboration with the Program for the Strengthening of the
Social Area (FAS) from the Office of Planning and Budget, conducted a qualitative
research project in 12 schools from unfavorable sociocultural contexts. Eight of these
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establishments excelled in the first national evaluation. The purpose of this study was to
uncover the attributes of those establishments that inspired high attainment levels in
underprivileged children. In particular, the dimensions explored were: (a) institutional
characteristics, (b) pedagogical focus, and (c) linkages to the family and surrounding
community. This study has become the basis for a comprehensive pedagogical proposal
for “full-time” schooling to be implemented in 10% of public educational establishments
serving the poorest children in the nation (Uruguay—ANEP-MECAEP, 1997). 
School supervisors 
        The school inspectorate is organized hierarchically from the national-central level
to the departmental-regional level to the local-zonal level. Although theoretically
organized in a decentralized fashion (Macedo, 1995), school supervisors abide closely
by the mandates established centrally at the Technical Inspection unit of the Primary
Education Council (World Bank, 1994). 
        The supervisory cadre has a long tradition of evaluative activities at the school
level. Schools are required to self-design and self-administer initial, mid-year and final
exams in mathematics and language at all grade levels in order to appraise academic
attainment. Inspectors must report on student test scores and specify the percentage of
students that can master specific competencies, such as oral expression, orthography,
reading comprehension, production of a text, resolution of algorithms, or recognition of
geometrical figures. (Note 9) 
        In addition, inspectors are instructed to conduct their own institutional assessments
in order to look beyond academic achievement as “the only objective testimonial of the
level and quality” of educational services (see, for example,
Uruguay—ANEP-CEP-Inspección Técnica, 1991a; 1991b; 1991c). They collect data on
a wide a variety of measures related to educational quality, including student attitudinal
qualities (respect, self- confidence, tolerance), absenteeism rates, repetition rates,
classroom pedagogical approaches, availability of didactic materials, in-service
professional development opportunities, and extent of parental involvement (see, for
instance, Inspección Departamental de Montevideo, 1998). Supervisors produce a
comprehensive school profile on the basis of this information and elaborate in
conjunction with school authorities a strategic plan to address the shortcomings
identified in this process. 
        The national assessment conducted by UMRE summed itself to the battery of
school diagnostic information available to the inspectorate. UMRE elaborated reports
tailored for the supervisory cadre categorizing schools by sociocultural context and
performance level (UMRE, 1998c). Supervisors also had access to the scores of the
schools under their tutelage. UMRE developed a series of workshops to familiarize
inspectors with the results of this standardized evaluation and suggest potential courses
of action that they may take to enhance educational quality. 
        Overall, the inspectorate gives high marks to UMRE. They underscore that it “has
been extremely useful” (Interview UGN16) and has spurred a transformation throughout
the educational system at various levels.
We discovered that, it is important to have these data at the national level.
In second place, this information is not only useful for the [educational]
system, but for schools themselves. There were certain guarantees respected
of all operations conducted. [The assessment] is not assigning blame in the
face of potential deficits or anything like it. It is simply an objective
measure that goes beyond [curricular] contents, and looks at much broader
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processes. … In general terms, everybody is conscious that this is something
valuable (Interview UGN9).
        The assessment was a starting point to begin to understand the weaknesses in
schooling, particularly for low-income children. Furthermore, it paved the way for the
adoption of specific remedial actions to address these shortcomings.
This mass evaluation of [student] achievement has put on the table quite
clearly what all teachers have been perceiving for many years: how little
children in situations of social exclusion learn. The evaluation took into
consideration the educational level of the mother, home crowding, or the
number of children in the family. [This systematized information] gave us,
at the educational system level, some tools to correct in part this situation of
low student achievement by updating teachers … and proposing useful
strategies in the areas of psychology, language and mathematics. From this
point of view, it served an important professional upgrading role throughout
the nation. It allowed many teachers to connect [with their students],
because many knew that things were going poorly but it wasn't clear the
reason why. It was useful to find new pathways (Interview UGN10).
Supervisors praise the technical reports and pedagogical recommendations put forward
by UMRE. They are described as “filled with proposals for action” and “based on solid
theoretical foundations” (Interview UGN15). “For me, [UMRE] has been very
advantageous because of the exchange of materials. Their contributions are very helpful
… Really, they have been a great technical support” (Interview UGN13). 
        The national assessment has also served as a model towards a new educational
paradigm. Traditionally, educators have emphasized memorization drills of curricular
contents. The UMRE test, instead, moved away from appraising curricular contents to
assessing competencies. A supervisor suggests that the UMRE test “took place precisely
at a time when other pedagogical changes were taking place, and UMRE was able to
appropriate itself of all this … and motivate a re-elaboration of [educational] processes”
(Interview UGN23).
Inspector 1. [UMRE] moved us. It put us into contact with [new] literature,
with another modality of evaluation that in turn implied another modality of
[curricular] planning (Interview UGN19).
Inspector 2. The results obliged us to think about the way curricular
proposals were being implemented in educational establishments and how
children were learning. The failure of students … suggested that perhaps it
was necessary to reformulate the educational project (Interview UGN14).
        The inspectorate has played a crucial role in bringing the lessons from the first
national evaluation into the classroom. Across regions, the supervisory cadre was
required to organize in commissions to reflect upon student outcomes and devise plans
of action that responded directly to the needs identified. These sessions focused on “the
role and mission of the inspector” as a catalyst for change (Interview UGN12).
The departmental inspector asked [us] to conduct a study, an analysis of the
results, and see what we, as a departmental inspectorate, could do. I was
recently reviewing this, and we had accorded to work with institutional
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projects … Every supervisor, following these general guidelines, could
request for funds to implement an intervention project in reference to the
[UMRE] test results (Interview UGN30).
        Inspectors were encouraged to adapt the guidelines outlined in departmental
commissions to the social realities of the establishments they oversaw. In certain
localities, supervisors organized 2- to 3-month seminars “to support educators with the
findings of new research, and a theoretical framework” that delved not only on how
students learn but what is relevant learning (Interview UGN13). In most districts, the
favored approach has been to intercede directly with school administrators. “We work
on specific proposals with our principals, who in turn pour this effort into institutional
projects developed together with their teachers” (Interview UGN21). Lower scoring
schools have received preferential attention over higher achieving establishments. 
        There is a growing sense that UMRE has imbued the educational system with a
reflexive and renovating spirit. Regardless of the actual transformations that may have
occurred as product of the first national evaluation, supervisors concur that UMRE has
been responsible for bringing to the fore a national dialogue on the effectiveness of
educational services and practices.
Personally, I perceive that there have been changes. Changes in the good
sense. There has been an evolution, in theory and in practice. There is a
theoretical discussion about [educational] issues, which gets translated into
daily activities. … I have never seen such quick change. I believe this is
positive (Interview UGN20).
        Despite this strong endorsement to the work and outcomes of UMRE, inspectors do
express reserve towards the national evaluation system. First, they underscore that the
measurement of student achievement is not a new activity in the Uruguayan educational
landscape “We have always evaluated,” attests one supervisor unequivocally (Interviews
UGN22).
Inspector 1. In terms of evaluation, I believe that teachers have been
working a lot previously on this subject. And so have inspectors. Yes, I
share with others that the [UMRE] materials we received have triggered
reflection among educators, but I believe that we have been working
continuously on evaluation (Interview UGN17).
Inspector 2. I suggest that it is not new to evaluate. [The UMRE
assessment] is not new nor is it the only kind of evaluation. Of course, this
was an evaluation at the macro level and by an external agent to the school.
But we have never stopped evaluating within schools because this is
inherent to teachers' practices: evaluating, planning, and researching
(Interview UGN15).
        Second, the supervisory cadre is concerned about the lack of coordination between
the central Technical Inspection and the national assessment. Although all levels of the
inspectorate (national, departmental and zonal) are represented in UMRE's advisory
council, some supervisors protest that there has not been sufficient participation or
communication between the two agencies.
There is a need to polish certain instances [of participation] so that they are
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truly effective. Sometimes it is not enough to say that we are participating,
that we want to participate. It is necessary that these spaces be created. The
possibility is not always present. … The will has been there, but the spaces
are not instrumented so that we can actually share our opinions (Interview
UGN12).
        Ultimately, the inspectorate is wary of the overlap between UMRE's and their own
functions. Supervisors stress that the national evaluation does not supersede their role in
the education sector. “I believe [the UMRE evaluation] was a new thing for the
educational system, but under no circumstance it precludes the other kind of evaluation
that we have been conducting. They are complementary” (Interview UGN15). Some
suggest that UMRE is an external agency that has unfairly arrogated their jurisdiction.
The fact is that UMRE belongs to an organism that is called MECAEP and
that is parallel to the normative system. It is alien to the Primary Education
Council and to the [educational] system. Even though one may value some
of the actions that they perform, we can't stop feeling this way. It is not an
evaluation generated within the Primary Education Council. It comes out of
an external organism. I believe this is one of the issues that produces great
aggravation (Interview UGN10).
        Others remark that UMRE has been unabashedly displacing them with an agenda of
which they claimed to have no knowledge. “[UMRE] was coming above us. Sometimes
we didn't even know what they were doing” (Interview UGN16). And yet others claim
that UMRE oversteps the separation of responsibilities between the autonomous
councils of the National Administration of Public Education (Interview UGN12).
Inspector 1. Over the entire evaluative history in our country the ones that
always performed a pedagogical review, a study, were the supervisory cadre
and the Primary Education Council. Presently, that review is being done
externally. We now wonder repeatedly, as inspectors, to what extent it is
valid that somebody else comes along, with other possibilities, with other
mechanisms, with more people, to do what we are doing. The measurement
performed by UMRE is parallel to the functions of this deconcentrated
authority (Interview UGN13).
Inspector 2. The issue is that [UMRE and the inspectorate] each have their
own lines of action. The inspectorate has a very clear agenda. But these
lines of action get intercepted. Supposedly, UMRE ought to be an advisory
or collaborative board in support of our activities. But if their actions are
intercepting ours, or we are being displaced by UMRE, then that is where
things are starting to become unwound (Interview UGN16).
        In summary, supervisors object to the fact that UMRE is an external agency to the
inspectorate with comparable functions. They resent that UMRE has had the ability to
act independently, the authority to command the attention of educational establishments
and the resources to implement directly remedial activities. To some extent, UMRE has
come to embody a potential threat to the supervisory cadre. In a few schools, teachers
even give credence to the rumor that the supervisory cadre will disappear or that it will
be restructured. These criticisms not withstanding, the general consensus is that UMRE
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has been a positive asset and ought to continue the work that it has begun. “A system
that does not evaluate itself cannot improve,” remarks an inspector (Interview UGN17).
According to the supervisory cadre, it is its organizational structure and relationship to
the Primary Education Council that, in their eyes, begs to be redefined.
Principals and teachers 
        In hindsight, teachers and principals believe that the first national evaluation was an
important experience. Private and public schools, as well as low- and high-income
establishments concur that the UMRE assessment “was very useful, because it helped us
to see where were our flaws, what we can do about them, and how we can change”
(Interview UES2). 
        In its inception, teachers were suspicious of the UMRE test (Interview UGN9).
Some expressed concern about whether student performance would be a means to
appraise their own professional performance. Others feared that if their students did not
attain high marks, they might be transferred to another grade (UMRE, 1996a). The
Association of Teachers of Montevideo (ADEMU) expressed its rejection and
opposition to UMRE. ADEMU protested that this was a test devised by an entity
external to the Primary Education Council and supported by international donor
agencies. “The economic expenditure that [the evaluation] supposes,” the teachers' union
announced in a newspaper communiqué, “does not conform to the austerity criteria that
govern the education budget” (El País, 1995). The Uruguayan Federation of Teachers
(FUM) also declared deep reservations towards the national assessment.
In the second semester of 1996 and just prior to the measurement, the
teachers' union picked up the debate [on the UMRE evaluation]. We
reiterated certain existing reparations, about its expense and the degree of
dependency to the World Bank's orientations. New elements of concern
were also incorporated, like … the possibility of using the results to
categorize schools, to provide differentiated salaries to teachers according to
test scores, to stigmatize a certain group of teachers or schools. Also, that it
may favor the private sector in some way or other to the extent that it was
predictable that public schools would have worse results than private ones.
Another series of criticisms were directed to the pertinence of the
instruments and the appropriateness of administering one instrument to
measure processes in different social realities. Finally, there were concerns
about the operational organization in itself, who was going to apply the
tests, the access teachers would have, which guarantees existed about the
formulation of the tests, the trustworthiness of correction criteria. The
criticisms varied from highly ideological considerations, to reserve and
distrust, to concerns about the everyday operations of the classroom. There
was a wide scope of opinions (Interview UGN37).
        Over time, these misgivings were assuaged. Although ADEMU remained defiant to
the first national evaluation and encouraged educational establishments to forestall the
entrance to exam proctors, teachers and principals collaborated with this governmental
initiative. The Uruguayan Federation of Teachers recognizes that UMRE's “open attitude
and desire to consult with the teachers' unions and technical-pedagogical assemblies” led
to their participation in the Advisory Group and cooperation with the national test
(Interview UGN37). An instructor from a rural area recounts that “at the beginning,
teachers were not invested [in the evaluation], but during the past year, people started to
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talk positively about it” (Interview UES13). A representative from the Association of
Private Education Establishments describes a similar experience:
When UMRE appeared, we had a brick on each hand. I was ready to kill
them. I had all my reasons against them ready. Little by little they convinced
us. Now, after all that has happened and as we get more results, they
convince us even more. It is OK that the test is obligatory. It has been a
valuable experience (Interview UEM32).
        The sense of trust and confidence garnered by UMRE among the teacher cadre can
be attributed to four factors:
strict confidentiality of test results, 1.
prompt devolution of student outcomes to school authorities, 2.
contextualization of test scores by sociocultural background, and 3.
abstention from holding teachers directly accountable for academic attainment.4.
Private school principal. Teachers [initally] felt on the spot. There was talk
…that instructors who did not reach certain scores would be removed from
office, that there was going to be a public ranking of schools, that this was
an attempt to regulate teachers. The people from UMRE were quite clear in
explaining what the objectives of the test were. But nobody believed them.
Everybody feared that behind this there was something that somehow would
harm teachers. … It is now clear that they kept their word, that it was useful,
that it helped us to review things, that two years later we are still working
with the results (Interview UEM33). 
Public school instructor. Teachers feared that their school would be
identified in some manner. And if the school was identified, so would their
classroom. And from the classroom, the teacher [would be recognized] …
But the data were confidential. Only we got to know the scores. And the
schools were later categorized according to their environment (Interview
UEM16).
        The national assessment has taken place within an education reform context that
has espoused “teacher-friendly policies.” “The appreciation of teacher professionalism
and training” has been one of the four pillars of the reform (Rama, 1998). Real average
teacher salaries have also risen progressively and consistently starting in 1993, after a
period of decline between 1988 and 1992 (Domingo, 1998). (Note 10) This general
setting might have contributed to generate a positive disposition among teachers towards
the objectives of UMRE and a sense of trust that the evaluation had not been established
to monitor their performance or increase their productivity. 
        Moreover, the attention of educators has not been focused on student achievement
measures exclusively. The sociocultural data collected by UMRE were featured as an
salient explanatory factor behind student performance. School background information
has become a key justification to account for the level of academic achievement attained
and an important consideration in the design of relevant remedial actions.
The system of evaluation also conducted a family survey that took into
consideration the role of the home in the educational process. We need to
take into account that children only spend four hours at school, and twenty
at home. The role of the family is fundamental in terms of the contributions
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that it can dispense to reaffirm educational processes (Interview UET21).
        Teachers report that test scores were subject of repeated discussion and reflection
sessions among school inspectors, principals, and the teacher cadre. The organization
and participation in these initiatives was mandated by the central government.
The following year, in 1997, when we came back to school, we were
required to study the results of the UMRE evaluation, point by point, during
our 'administrative days.' Then, we had to draw joint conclusions. It was an
obligation to read them. [The order] came to the school in the form of an
[official] act (Interview UES15).
        The outcomes of the 6th grade assessment were the starting point of a process of
pedagogical reflection for a wide range of public and private schools.
Medium-income school. On the basis of the [exam results], we developed a
plan for the following year. For instance, the discussion over problem
resolution was very important for us in order to go deeper into this issue, to
work more on reasoning. I don't know if this took us further away from the
[official curricular] program, but … Also, we've been working on the
language [curriculum] in teacher meetings. … In these sessions we analyzed
some of the test items (Interview UET4).
Medium-low income school. [UMRE] identified those competencies that
experience the greatest problems. … We studied the results and worked
together with other teachers. We presented the findings in teacher meetings,
and discussed the pros and the cons. We devised our [classroom] diagnostic
tests at the beginning of the year on the basis of the test outcomes in order
to give teachers the opportunity to continue working on these competencies
(Interview UES7).
Low-income school. The contents and approach [of the UMRE test]
challenged a great deal of ideas that we had. When we saw the exam and
what they were after, we came to realize that we were working wrong, that
we were working differently, that we were behind, that we were traditional.
… The results and the design of the test (which was a very good
proposition) led teachers to realize of everything that we lacked. From here
on, we started to review everything, not because we did well, but because
we could have done even much better (Interview UEM18).
Rural school. [The UMRE test] does not evaluate for the sake of evaluation,
to just get some numbers back. It is meant to improve [our future practices],
and to provide feedback. These are problem areas that require hard work
and a different approach (Interview UET10).
Private school. I believe this was a very positive experience. It allows
teachers to question if they are working well, along the lines they should be
working, or if their approach is satisfactory (Interview UES21).
        In some establishments, instructors aligned the course curricula according to the
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competencies measured by the UMRE test. Others describe that the evaluation triggered
greater coordination between grade curricula. And in yet some others, they allude to the
design of specific institutional projects to strengthen curricular objectives where students
scored poorly.
Low-income school. I liked the approach of the [UMRE] test. It was an
interesting proposition. The following year, we planned [our curriculum] on
the basis of the approach forwarded by the test. We worked together with
another sixth grade teacher on reasoning, geometry, numbers. We did all
this basing ourselves on the UMRE test. Last year there wasn't an
evaluation, but we administered the '96 exams at the end of the school year.
We got a completely different result. In mathematics, it was very good. In
language, it was low, but not as low as in the previous year. We even used
the same methodology. You could not ask questions to a classmate or the
teacher (Interview UEM3).
Rural school. I think that [the UMRE exam] was highly positive to shake
teachers up a bit. It led us to question ourselves about many competencies
and [curricular] areas that, perhaps, we were not developing well.
Throughout the school cycle, students do not receive the same type of
education. We might have missed a few steps. These concepts may not have
been grasped at the right time and kids drag this handicap into the sixth
grade. So the teacher covers the sixth grade curriculum, but oftentimes
students do not have clear the concepts or processes necessary to sustain
these new concepts. This is all very positive, so that we can all reflect. We
are all responsible for specific areas. We have to make sure that students
learn certain topics so that the teacher that follows can continue to build
upon them (Interview UET11).
Low-income school: Principal. We observed that we needed to start all over
again in language, particularly in reading comprehension. One of the factors
that exerted incidence on this question was the lack of books at home. … So
we developed a project. Instructor. Yes, we developed a project that sought
to overcome the current deficits. We called it “A Vegetable Garden to
Learn.” Through this project we are trying to address the problems detected
in the evaluations. ... We find unsatisfactory or insufficient levels in
competencies such as production of texts (… which comes to 52%), also
algorithms (52%) and problem solving (48%). Those are the competencies
with the lowest scores. Hence, we are trying to find solutions to those
problems. At the same time, we see the need to continue working on
discipline and the formation of good habits. The data from UMRE were
particularly useful here. The study showed that we had a 47.6% of
aggressiveness and misconduct, and lack of motivation or interest in a
29.9%. Through our little great project “A Vegetable Garden to Learn” we
are trying to bring parents into the school and integrate them. Our school is
from an unfavorable sociocultural context, and one of the problems that
affects much of our functioning is that parents are not involved in student
learning (Interviews UES9, UES10).
        The impact of the UMRE test on academic practices can be appraised most overtly
by how quickly it has become a standard for in-school evaluative practices. Public and
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private schools that cater to children from diverse communities manifest that they have
modeled their own student assessments after the UMRE test. Some establishments have
photocopied the UMRE test and re- administered it. Others have prepared a different test
with a comparable methodological approach.
Private school teacher. Some teachers used the [UMRE] test again [the
following year]. It was like a re- application. We've also used it as a model
for other tests (Interview UES21).
Public school teacher. I came to this school in 1997. I am the sixth grade
teacher. Last year we administered something similar [to the UMRE test]. It
was prepared here, together with other sixth grade teachers. … We started
to evaluate like UMRE. If the proposal is good, let's do it! I liked the
narrative and argumentative text parts of the test in particular (Interview
UES8).
        Without entering into the discussion regarding the appropriateness or desirability of
standardized evaluative practices in the classroom, it is apparent that UMRE's
assessment experience reveals the influence nationwide examinations may exert in
schooling practices, even in cases where these assessments do not involve high stakes
testing. Uruguayan teachers adopted the evaluative approach proposed by UMRE despite
of the fact that there were no incentive mechanisms or penalties openly associated with
this test. It is also opportune to highlight that teachers did not experience this alignment
an imposition of the central government or as a restriction to their pedagogical
autonomy. They welcomed this methodology for finding it interesting or innovative. 
        Educators underscore that the type of evaluation proposed by UMRE epitomizes a
novel pedagogical approach. Teachers find the emphasis on skill areas and problem
solving particularly attractive. On the other hand, they recognize that they lack the
know-how to implement it properly. That is, the methodological guidelines forwarded
by UMRE are at best an initial referent; in order to be truly effective, they ought to be
complemented with specific training.
Instructor 1. The methodological guides say “this should not be like this,”
but they don't explain how we should do it. Instructor 2. There have been
radical changes. We studied all our lives one way, under certain
methodology. Suddenly, and especially in reading and writing, everything
changes. Instructor 1. The explanations are very theoretical. Experts prepare
these materials, but they remain up there, in theoretical issues. They are not
very practical, or clear about how to apply them. Instructor 2. [They] first
have to come to terms that we are not mathematicians or linguists
(Interviews UES14, UES15).
        The difficulties experienced in implementing change in classroom practices,
according to teachers and principals, have centered around two broad predicaments: (a)
lack of capacity, and (b) institutional organizational impediments. These obstacles afflict
more acutely the public rather than the private sector, and low-income rather than
high-income contexts. 
        Moreover, teachers lack the institutional space and time to master new techniques
or ponder about educational practices. There are few opportunities for in-service
training, team curricular planning and professional development. A notable exception
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was the seminar organized by UMRE for urban establishments from unfavorable
sociocultural contexts.
There are establishments that take into consideration the UMRE data, but
there are also establishments that do not take advantage of [this
information] not because they do not want to, but because they lack the
institutional space for teachers to meet. There is no time for instructors to
come together and reflect. It is all left in the hands of the good will of
teachers to benefit from the results. … This is an obstacle. There is an
enormous quantity of information, but oftentimes it is wasted. It does not
reach the teacher as it should (Interview UGN12).
        Public establishments also undergo a frequent and dramatic staff turnover every
few years. This has been a standard feature of the Uruguayan educational system.
Educators are assigned permanent posts that they periodically vacate to fill in for
temporary more desirable positions. This shift causes a ripple effect, encouraging
another educator to leave her current post to fill in for that position now open. This
permanent flux of school staff interrupts medium-term institutional processes as well as
hinders educators from becoming intimately acquainted with local educational and
social conditions. 
[In 1996,] I was the sixth grade teacher. It was my first year in the school.
That year every teacher in the school was new. We had no knowledge of
those kids. And neither did the principal, who had been assigned to the
school the year before. It took us a year and a half to get to know the school
integrally. The only original thing that remained in the school were the
students (Interview UES18).
        Educators have also professed some objections to UMRE's instruments and
methodology. Classroom teachers, and especially those who work with low-income
children, criticize the first national evaluation on three counts primarily. First, they
object that UMRE depends upon the same instrument to evaluate disparate social
realities. It is conceived as intrinsically “unfair” that children from underprivileged
backgrounds must face the same exigencies as children that have access to plentiful
resources. (Note 11) Second, they protest that exams were administered by outside
proctors. The presence of an unknown person in the classroom allegedly distressed and
distracted students.
What I objected to was that the classroom teachers could not be the exam
proctors. They did not trust us. The job of the proctors was only to distribute
the tests, and we could have done that perfectly well. … There was too
much formality, and children are not used to it. … And that had a negative
impact. … Children were neither at ease nor comfortable in that
environment, and that was truly detrimental for them (Interview UET5).
Third, educators claim that unfamiliarity with a multiple choice methodology
encouraged students to guess answers or select responses randomly. 
        In spite of these reservations, UMRE has managed to establish itself quite quickly
within the Uruguayan educational landscape. This is a remarkable achievement provided
that the evaluation system is barely a few years old. The words of a trade union leader
capture this sentiment persuasively:
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I believe that at the [educational] system level, [UMRE] furnishes very
valuable and interesting information. Although with some difficulties, it has
been effectively incorporated into the school culture. The results are valued.
The lack of discussion about the application of the third grade assessment
immediately demonstrates that it has been incorporated into the school
dynamic (Interview UGN37).
        Teachers concur that participation in this experience has been beneficial. The
UMRE test has, at worst, successfully fostered a dialogue about classroom practices and,
in the best case scenarios, stimulated a renewal in pedagogic approaches.
I speak sincerely. Sometimes, when teachers have many years of experience,
we find that we must take on other activities outside school. The poor
economic conditions oblige us to search for other activities so that we can
live with dignity. Hence, suddenly we fossilize in certain aspects, certain
methodologies. This test allowed us to see that we can evaluate in a
different way. It has become a model. And it gave us bibliography so that
we can continue along the path paved by UMRE (Interview UET21)
        The first national evaluation has become a model on how to emphasize
competencies rather than straight curricular contents. Many educators, in fact, argue that
UMRE has taken the lead in educational matters, leaving the old official curricular
designs to recede into the background and prompting teachers to challenge long-held
assumptions.
Our [curricular] program says Venn diagrams, it says operations, it says
reasoning, it says application of knowledge, it says grammar, it says written
expression, it says oral expression, it says reading. That is how our
programs are currently structured. In the [UMRE] test, it said something
else: mother tongue, reflection on language, text production. In the program,
it says composition, it does not say written expression. Argumentative text
is nowhere. In other words, the program is not what was evaluated. … The
program talks about sentence grammar, … it talks about subject and
predicate, but [UMRE] measured it as contextual grammar. … We were
convinced that we were teaching, but we had not realized that what we had
in front was [expected of us too]. With UMRE, we came to realize that not
everything that we did was right, that students were not quite responsible
[for their shortcomings], that we needed to change behaviors (Interview
UET7).
In summary, the assessment of educational quality in Uruguay went beyond a mere
description of the conditions of schooling throughout the country. It was decidedly a call
to action.
3. National assessment and the character of the Uruguayan
nation-state 
 A. Assessment, rationality and State legitimacy
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Assessment for rational decision-making. 
        The UMRE assessments have been designed as a recurrent diagnostic instrument of
the characteristics of the Uruguayan education sector. “The evaluation of student
learning … is conceived as a systemic evaluation for feedback purposes” (UMRE,
1997a: 6). The main objective of UMRE is to supply educational actors—policy makers,
school inspectors, principals and teachers—with relevant and updated information about
student academic performance and the sociocultural variables that may condition it. This
information will promote educational quality and equity through two channels. First, it
identifies the strengths and shortcomings in education provision. Second, it sets the stage
for school actors and government officials to take the necessary steps to correct
deficiencies in the efficiency and distribution of educational services on the basis of
systematically collected and objective data.
What we endeavor is to produce information regarding … which skills
[students] have mastered and which ones they have not, what pedagogical
and institutional strategies have succeeded to instill fundamental learnings
in students from the neediest sectors and, finally, where it is still necessary
to invest and provide technical assistance to attain a more democratic
educational system that benefits all Uruguayan children without
socioeconomic distinctions” (UMRE, 1996b: 1-2)
        The national government has employed assessment outcomes to shape remediation
policies and direct technical and economic resources to those segments of the population
in greatest need. Student achievement measures and sociocultural context considerations
have played a modest role in the allocation of didactic materials, technical assistance,
and funds for school-based projects. The central State, however, has prioritized
socioeconomic variables over strict performance standards for redistributive purposes. 
        UMRE expects to bring about a renovation in pedagogical practices and classroom
activities on the basis of the data it collects. Specifically, the assessment system
propounds the following objectives:
To make information available about [student] competency levels in areas
considered to be fundamental; [and]
To provide that information to teachers so that they can search for
pedagogical alternatives that may revert situations prior to the exit of
students from the primary educational system (UMRE, 1997a: 5).
        Teachers and principals have been formally instructed to review the findings of the
first national evaluation and devise compensatory strategies in response to them. The
supervisory cadre has been closely involved in this process too, particularly in schools
from unfavorable sociocultural contexts.
Assessment and State legitimacy 
        UMRE has consistently reported and analyzed student achievement outcomes in
relation to socioeconomic measures. The first national report underscores the link
between test results and background variables (UMRE, 1996g). The second national
report is exclusively devoted to the impact of socioeconomic factors on academic
performance (UMRE, 1997f). In other words, in Uruguay, the concepts of educational
quality and equity are inextricably intertwined. The national evaluation system embodies
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another conduit for the central government to fulfill its obligation to reduce the gap
between the privileged and underprivileged sectors of society.
[I]t is considered that having information about fundamental skill levels is
crucial to recuperate the democratizing role of education. The results
obtained in the first national evaluation corroborate that strong inequalities
in the quality of learning opportunities exist among students from social
environments with great deficits. Although it is known that this is due to a
multiplicity of factors, oftentimes external to the educational system, we
assume our responsibility for the permanent improvement of the quality of
learning. In socially disadvantaged sectors, the mediating function of the
school becomes all the more necessary in order to contribute to the personal
and social development of children (UMRE, 1997a: 6).
        The contextualization of average test scores has become standard practice not just
in official documentation, but in the collective mind of educators throughout the country
as well. Educational establishments are keenly aware of their own location within the
“socioacademic map” and have learned to interpret test results in relation to the social
conditions in which the school is inserted.
What is ultimately fundamental? To evaluate [student] linguistic and
mathematical competencies, and to precise their family contexts. We have
to see what the incidence of the [family] background is [on student
achievement] (Interview UET14).
        The identification of UMRE with the plight for educational equity has been
instrumental for the legitimation of the State's evaluative activities. The collection of
student achievement data has validated the reform initiatives of the national government
by providing scientific proof of the erosion in the quality of educational services while
furnishing rational-technical justifications for the pursuit of these compensatory
measures. But perhaps more importantly, UMRE has bolstered the image of the central
State as an interventionist agency supporting and tending for the neediest sectors of the
population. As a teachers' union leader attests,
[UMRE] ended up inspiring satisfaction. That is, it supplied schools with a
depiction of their [academic] situation cross-referenced to sociocultural
variables, repositioning results in terms of their contexts. This allows for a
type of public stance that is congruous with the trade union's habitual
position. Isn't it true? [It refers to] the degree of predetermination and
conditioning faced by children as they enter the school. … In short, there
was a national test and there were results of that test that did not merit
objections (Interview UGN37).
        There are two additional factors that have ratified the validity of the assessment
instrument and, ergo, the evaluation of educational quality as a legitimate State activity.
First, the national evaluation apparatus has been construed as the fruit of a consensual
process that has incorporated all of the actors in the educational system, including
central government officials, regional and local school inspectors, teacher
representatives from the Technical-Pedagogical Assemblies, trade union leaders, and
private sector delegates. Second, the State has secured the support of educators by
largely circumscribing their liability over test outcomes. “There is not going to be an
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index finger accusing anybody,” declared Germán Rama, the National Director of the
ANEP, upon the dissemination of test results (El Observador, 1996).
Obviously, the deterioration [of the educational system] was not the unique
or principal responsibility of teachers. A multiplicity of factors external to 
the educational system has been in operation for this to occur: the mass
expansion of education, the deterioration of the quality of life of families,
the retraction in educational investments during the military regime, etc.
However, it is necessary to recognize that there are variables internal to
the system that affect the quality of student learning: the pertinence of 
pedagogical strategies, the relevance of the curriculum, the modalities and
expectations inherent in academic evaluations, the fact that schools from the
poorest areas are the gateway to the teaching profession, among others
(UMRE, 1996b: 1, bold in the original).
        The circumscription of teacher liability was accomplished in two ways. First, by
showcasing background variables as explanatory factors of academic attainment.
“Student learning,” UMRE (1997e: 2) attests, “is strongly stratified as a function of the
sociocultural context within which each school operates.” And secondly, by the central
State acknowledging accountability over the conditions in schooling services. As
established earlier, the national government accepts “its responsibility for the permanent
improvement of the quality of learning” (UMRE, 1997a: 6, my italics). 
        The premise that the assessment of academic achievement legitimizes the central
State potentially encompasses within itself a paradox. On one hand, evaluation endorses
State action by making public its commitment and responsibility over educational
processes and outcomes. On the other hand, the measurement of student learning implies
a high risk: that poor test performance may provide irrevocable evidence of
governmental inefficiency in educational service provision. Thus, if the central State is
directly accountable for schooling processes and outcomes, doesn't evaluation jeopardize
State legitimacy by calling attention to the deficiencies in schooling? 
        Sociological institutional theorists posit that assessment is primarily a symbolic
activity (Meyer and Rowan, 1978). Its main objective, according to this paradigm, is not
to produce results or provide relevant data for a diagnosis of the conditions of the
education sector, but rather to appear that it does. That is, assessment strives to imbue
the policy-making process with a guise of scientific rationality. The measurement of
academic performance is foremost a legitimizing mechanism of State action by
associating the policy-making process with scientific analysis.
        Institutional sociologists underscore that attention to test scores may have a
deleterious effect by uncovering inefficiencies within the educational system.
Consequently, the relationship between assessment and legitimacy depends upon a loose 
coupling between evaluative processes and outcomes. In other words, assessment plays
predominantly a figurative role, where the act of evaluating has greater salience than the
findings it may uncover. This disjunction blurs the inconsistencies between educational
goals and the existing conditions of schooling. In summary, institutional sociologists
profess that assessment systems prescribe officially acceptable standards of behavior and
operation that uphold State action. On the other hand, these principles that educational
establishments professedly embrace are in fact decoupled from the actual organization of
schooling. 
        What do we observe in the Uruguayan case? The central government has reported
aggregate test results from the UMRE evaluation at the national level. Student
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achievement data were not broken down by department or educational establishment.
This practice differs significantly from evaluative experiences in other countries in the
region that report testing outcomes by school or by region. Although withholding
individual school data may indeed hide inconsistencies in educational service provision,
it does not absolve the central government from liability over test outcomes. On the
contrary, protecting individual school variability makes the central State the sole
publicly accountable agent for educational quality. This strategy would appear to
contradict the predictions of sociological institutional theorists. The Uruguayan
government's approach to give ample dissemination to test results and advocate
reflection over student outcomes, within a context where the central State has accepted
responsibility for the quality of educational services, could give way to a crisis of
legitimacy for the central government. 
        National test scores in the first national evaluation were, at best, substandard. Over
65% of students scored unsatisfactorily in mathematics and 43% performed poorly in
language. (Note 12) Despite this inferior record, and contrary to common wisdom,
UMRE did not delegitimate central State action. The central State, as predicted by
sociological institutionalism, shifted the focus of attention from student outcomes to the
role of sociocultural variables in academic achievement.
        Assessment data fostered a national debate about the impact of socioeconomic
forces in educational services. Evidence of the decay of the education sector was
primarily a backdrop to champion governmental compensatory initiatives and vindicate
the participation of the central State in social policies. The central government could
afford to expose the deterioration in schooling because the root causes of the present
educational landscape preceded the current administration. These had been already
documented in detail in the student achievement studies conducted by the CEPAL in
1990 (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, 1993; 1991; 1990). 
        Moreover, assessment data demonstrated that, controlling for sociocultural context,
the performance of public sector schools is equivalent to their private sector
counterparts.
[W]hen we take into consideration the sociocultural context within which
schools carry out their activities, results vary: public schools that operate in
the most favorable contexts obtain results as good as private schools in the
same contexts. At the other extreme, rural schools obtain results similar and
sometimes even better than urban establishments from contexts equally
unfavorable (UMRE, 1997f: 5).
Hence, UMRE asserted the value of public education and, consequently, of State-run
educational service provision. 
        Then, if assessment does not jeopardize State legitimation, are evaluation practices
in Uruguay an instance of a loosely coupled system as predicted by sociological
institutionalism? That is, is the measurement of student achievement primarily a
symbolic activity where evaluative processes are of greater consequence that their
outcomes? 
        Interview and observational data collected for this research study suggest otherwise.
In fact, school actors manifest that there is significant coincidence between State
mandates around the UMRE evaluation and actual school behavior. In other words, there
is evidence that central State action has successfully elicited organizational alignments.
Teachers, principals and supervisors alike express a high level of familiarity with
assessment policies. In most cases, they have largely complied with regulations to
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review and analyze test results. Furthermore, educators concur that this assessment has
triggered reflection and some renovation in educational practices. As it has been
documented in the section above, some schools have devised institutional projects in
response to the findings of the evaluation. Other educational establishments have
modeled their classroom and evaluative activities after UMRE's appraisal, focusing for
example on competencies rather than on curricular contents. 
        The degree of influence of the UMRE evaluation on educational practices stands
out provided that this is a low-stakes test. There are no incentives tied to performance
standards. Neither are educational establishments liable to the public or to the
government for student scores. Similarly, a comparison between UMRE's appraisal and
other school-based diagnostic evaluative exercises confirms that the former has had
quite a distinct impact on classroom activities.
Low-income school instructor. When we conducted our own evaluations,
we tested concepts. The type of evaluation of UMRE, it makes you think
and balance things out. It leads you to wonder what lies behind [a question].
It is evaluating the process itself. And it is providing feedback to our work.
That is what we need to do … We need to change (Interview UET15).
        Two factors can account for this budding transformation in the classroom brought
about by the national assessment. First, the evaluation was built and designed with the
support and participation of the education community at- large. This process has fostered
among educational actors a sense of appropriation and commitment to the work of
UMRE. Second, UMRE accompanied its evaluative activities with in-service training
workshops for teachers, principals and inspectors. Professional development has
catalyzed the patronage and implementation of novel curricular and pedagogical
propositions.
        In summary, the Uruguayan central State is responsible and accountable for the
conditions of the educational system. Assessment may potentially delegitimate State
action by underscoring the weaknesses in the education sector. In spite of the
shortcomings in schooling services exposed by UMRE, the national government did not
suffer a crisis of legitimacy (Weiler, 1990). In fact, the central State was able to rally a
wide basis of support behind this initiative. As sociological institutionalism predicts, the
central State shifted the focus of public attention from testing outcomes to a
comprehensive policy initiative addressing the socioeconomic wants that condition
student learning. This displacement, however, did not necessarily decouple assessment
from schooling practices. This is particularly striking given that the national evaluation
was not designed a high stakes test for students, teachers or principals. The UMRE
evaluation acted a conduit to channel the might of the State apparatus behind a
pedagogical and curricular transformation. 
B. Assessment and State ideology
        Uruguay has a long-standing tradition of public support of social sector activities. It
has the highest per capita spending on social sectors among Latin American countries.
Social expenditures comprise approximately 50% of total government expenditures
(World Bank, 1994). The State has been an ardent defender of public education and a
champion of the conception of the Estado docente—the State as teacher (Fernández,
1997). 
        Uruguayan education reform program has leaned on two principles: (a) the pursuit
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and defense of basic social entitlements, and (b) the resolute participation of the State in
the attainment of these entitlements through social promotion and redistributive policies.
“The history of Uruguay shows that if you want to change qualitatively a social sector, it
must originate from a strong State presence,” remarks a high-ranking government
official. “It is unimaginable to think of education reform without the State being an
important protagonist” (Interview UGN7). 
        At an historical junction when the Keynesian Welfare State has been pronounced to
be “in terminal decline” (Jessop, 1993: 34), the ANEP frames its vision for central State
action in the education sector within this very paradigm. Renato Opertti, the National
Coordinator for the Planning Area of the ANEP, portrays the current efforts to transform
the educational system along this vein.
The [education] Reform is rooted on a vindication of the Welfare State, in
its objectives as well as in its contents; indirectly, it defies reform programs
steered by the idea of an auditing and regulating State that “delegates” onto
the market the direct provision of services (Opertti, 1997: 146).
        Santiago González Cravino, another high-ranking government official, tempers this
model of State action, while reaffirming the irrevocable duty of the national government
to support the neediest sectors of the population.
In order to attend to disadvantaged people, we need an Interventionist State.
In order to favor and sustain the middle class, it is essential, sometimes, the
intervention of the State. But the emphasis ought to lie in giving it a more
positive and active role, using the private sector as a motivating instrument
(González Cravino, 1995: 10).
        The education reform program, an initiative born in the context of “budgetary
limitations” and “commitments and conditions generated by international
organizations,” has been target of harsh criticisms from those that believe that the central
State has relinquished its historic role.
This “State” has had no incidence in overcoming the sociocultural
deficiencies of increasing student cohorts. Neither have “compensatory” or
“focalization” policies demonstrated any ability to surmount … the true
causes of pauperization, marginality and social exclusion (Pallares, 1998:
64).
President Sanguinetti, however, has staunchly defended his agenda for the
transformation of the educational system as a “new form of humanist liberalism based
precisely on the promotion of equity” (El País, 1997). 
        UMRE has evolved and operated within this framework of State-societal relations.
Hence, the assessment system has sought to align its activities with a model of
governmental action that promotes the production and distribution of social well-being.
The Uruguayan education reform is statist in its defense of public education.
The [UMRE] evaluation is very much linked to this. It is an attempt to
promote social policies, to provide services. It is not symptomatic of a
retracting [State] (Interview UGN3).
        The national evaluation, as already documented earlier in this article, has stressed
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the utilization of student achievement information in support of remediation programs
intended for disadvantaged communities. As test results have come to light, the central
government has assumed responsibility for the conditions of schooling and voiced an
institutional commitment to enact a policy agenda to address the shortcomings
identified. In this sense, the national evaluation has proceeded in the spirit of social
accountability and under the currency of social equalization. 
        The construction of UMRE in these terms has been a deliberate choice. The World
Bank, who currently finances UMRE activities, had originally proposed an evaluation
system based on a consumer accountability paradigm. The assessment would have
operated under a different logic where parents, as consumers of educational services,
rely on test results to select an educational establishment for their children (Últimas
Noticias, 1996). When the administration of Germán Rama took charge of the ANEP in
1995, however, there was a change in strategy and UMRE was shaped after the
assessment model that Rama had developed earlier at CEPAL (Comisión Económica
para América Latina y el Caribe, 1991) 
        The association between the assessment system and the World Bank has inspired
some mistrust regarding the credibility of the model of State-societal relations espoused
by UMRE. In fact, this partnership has threatened to interfere with the legitimacy of the
national appraisal. The Uruguayan Federation of Teachers and the
Technical-Pedagogical assemblies have expressed opposition to the evaluation of
student achievement “because of its international perspective,” associated with
neoliberal policies that seek to reduce governmental intervention in the provision of
social services (Interviews UGN6, UGN37).
The [Central Board Council] has deteriorated the autonomy of the [Primary
Education Council] by assigning functions to a parallel organization
(MECAEP). [MECAEP] operates with resources conditioned by
international loans and imposes EDUCATIONAL policies that do not
respond to the needs forwarded by the NATIONAL TEACHER CADRE
(Asamblea Nacional Técnico Docente, 1998: 30, caps in the original).
        The national government, in turn, underscores its independence from the
multilateral organization and reaffirms to the public opinion its defense of public
intervention in the social sectors. “We are not dominated by [the World Bank],” asserts
Claudio Williman, the vice president of the Central Board Council, “We are an
underdeveloped country where State involvement is vital. … Education is a competency
of the State” (El Diario, 1996).
C. Assessment and State control
        The Uruguayan educational system is structured in a greatly centralized and
hierarchical fashion. All decisions—from administrative matters to curricular
frameworks—are determined in Montevideo and uniformly enforced throughout the
country. “Teachers in Uruguay behave like an army,” remarks a government official. “If
you give them an order, they will follow it” (Interview UGN3). There are extremely
limited instances of organizational decentralization or institutional autonomy
(Fernández, 1997). 
        World Bank report ascribes to this “extreme” concentration of power a profoundly
deleterious effect.
The highly centralized public primary education system hinders undertaking
the required changes to achieve greater sectoral efficiency, equity, and
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quality. Centralization has restricted teachers and local managerial authority
and initiative, reduced teacher-pupil interaction, discouraged personal
growth and professional advancement, and limited the extent to which
managerial staff and teacher opinions in pedagogical and administrative
matters are solicited and recognized by those in charge of their workplace.
On the other hand, centralization has overburdened policymakers and higher
level staff with routine tasks and decisions, depriving them from having a
more long-term strategic and prospective approach to the sector. The 19
[Departmental Inspectorates] are more concerned with transmitting centrally
adopted policies and guidelines and collecting data on behalf of ANEP's
central offices tan with enforcing activities to enhance the quality of
education for which they are ill equipped and trained (World Bank, 1994:
11).
        Uruguayan scholars concur that the educational system may benefit from greater
flexibility and autonomy in its governance (Pallares, 1998; Fernández, 1997; Macedo,
1995). An initial step in this direction has been the disbursement of small grants to
educational establishments for the implementation of school-based initiatives that can
enhance educational quality (Uruguay—ANEP-CODICEN, 1998). 
        Undoubtedly, the national assessment supports the concentration of authority at the
central level. As Hans Weiler (1993: 76) proposes, “evaluation is not merely the
gathering and dissemination of information; it also has something to do with the
authoritative interpretation of standards of knowledge and is endowed with a
considerable amount of force, both real and symbolic.” UMRE reinforces curricular
mandates pronounced by the ANEP. It also fosters the alignment of school practices
with centralized prescriptions. A government informant even claims that UMRE was an
attempt from the central State to exert greater control over the flow of information on
academic achievement after the release of the highly-critical CEPAL studies (Interview
UGN3). 
        On the other hand, the organization and implementation of the national evaluation
defy this depiction of closed centralized control. UMRE has dedicated great effort to the
incorporation of an ample array of voices and opinions into this process. It has steadily
encouraged the systematic and continuous participation of all levels of civil society. The
UMRE Advisory Group consists of representatives from the public and the private
sectors, as well as central, departmental and local jurisdictions. Teachers, principals and
supervisors have been repeatedly consulted on a wide variety of topics, from the design
of the curricular matrix to be appraised to the development of test items. 
        UMRE's experience serves as a model of centralized governance sustained and
enriched by democratic cooperation. The involvement of the Technical-Pedagogical
assemblies and the teachers' union in the national assessment is living proof that even
unpopular policies may garner the consent of reticent social actors in an environment
that nurtures open and effective dialogue.
4. Concluding remarks
        UMRE incarnates a model of social—as opposed to consumer—accountability
where the central State must respond for the conditions of schooling. In this paradigm,
the national government not only functions as a guarantor of educational quality and
equity, but it also upholds its obligation as provider of educational services. The
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evaluation of student performance is an avenue to defend the role of public education as
an equalizing social force and reaffirm the central government's support to the neediest
sectors of the population. 
        However, student performance measures, as already expressed repeatedly, may
potentially exert a destabilizing role by highlighting deficiencies in educational service
provision. The central State averts the potential crisis of legitimation (Weiler, 1990) by
shifting the character of assessment from the measurement of student outcomes to the
remediation of the ills in student learning. 
        The conceptualization of education as a governmental responsibility has largely
insulated the assessment process from finger-pointing or assigning blame. It is not
teachers or schools that are being tested, but the educational system as a whole. This
approach has generated the potential for educators to identify with and participate in
evaluative activities. Democratic participation, in turn, buttresses the legitimacy of the
assessment scheme. 
        UMRE has spurred the beginnings of a curricular and pedagogical transformation
throughout the Uruguayan educational landscape. This is a promising first step for an
evaluation system in its formative years. As new data are collected and UMRE
consolidates its role within the education sector, the central State will face a new
challenge: It will have to account for the effectiveness of its own policies in reducing
existing inequalities. 
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1.
This analysis excludes tertiary education.2.
In 1998, the ANEP signed a loan agreement with the World Bank for an additional
US$ 28 million for the second phase of the MECAEP project.
3.
This section draws largely from personal interviews conducted with government
officials involved in the design and implementation of the primary and secondary
national assessment systems.
4.
In the 1998 evaluation, teachers were invited to participate in the formulation of
test items.
5.
Correlation coefficients and standard errors were not provided by the source
document.
6.
A government informant explains the reasons behind secondary teachers' more
contentious attitude in this manner:
The secondary education teacher cadre is very different to primary
school educators. The latter is a professionalized group. One hundred
percent of [primary school] teachers obtain their degrees. They all
went to normal institutes. They all have the title hanging somewhere
7.
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at home. Hence, they have a positional culture that is more
homogeneous. In secondary schooling, only 30% of the people
teaching have specific preparation for being a 'professor.' There are
university professionals, university students .... Thus, the
heterogeneity is much greater. ... Secondly, secondary teachers have
adopted a "let’s see" attitude towards the education reform. Primary
teachers were "calmer," more easy going, less opposition. That is why
MECAEP, and more specifically UMRE, has been able to secure an
active collaboration, inclusive of the teachers’ unions and the ATD,
the Technical-Pedagogical Assembly. In the case of secondary
schools, the unions were more in opposition from the get go, more
combative because the education reform was deeper. The ATD is also
more politicized. The ATD leaders have emphasized their own ATD
position over the stance of the [teachers'] union (Interview UGN3).
There is currently some uncertainty regarding the transfer of UMRE from the
MECAEP project to the ANEP due to potential changes in the organizational and
institutional structure of the evaluation system.
8.
The characteristics of these evaluations vary from school to school. Thus, average
student test scores are not comparable across schools.
9.
Real average teacher salaries, however, are still slightly below their 1988 level
nonetheless.
10.
This stance contradicts another argument that points at the inherent inequity of
holding different expectations for students from dissimilar sociocultural contexts,
and particularly of holding lower expectations for children from lower-income
backgrounds. The challenge would be not to "veil" the differences among social
groups, but rather to introduce the necessary compensatory measures so that all
students, regardless of their sociocultural context, can equally reach high
achievement levels or national standards.
11.
Unsatisfactory test performance was defined by UMRE as inferior to 60% of
correct answers.
12.
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